Points of Convergence and Divergence between Competing theories informing Human Machine Interaction Law

Beneath their distinct vocabularies, René Girard’s Mimetic Theory, Lev Vygotsky’s Activity Theory, and Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory converge on a singular, devastating project: the complete demolition of the autonomous Cartesian subject. All three frameworks reject the foundational Western myth that human thought, desire, and action originate within an isolated, self-contained mind. Instead, they insist that human existence is fundamentally triadic, mediated, and relational.

The primary pillar of their convergence is the total rejection of direct, unmediated subject-object relations. In Girard’s mimetic framework, a human subject never desires an object directly; desire is always filtered through a third element, the mediator or model whose wanting illuminates the object. Activity Theory mirrors this structural geometry precisely in the realm of labor and cognition: a human subject never acts upon the material world with bare hands or unmediated thought, but always through the cultural tool or sign system. Latour extends this logic into a radical architecture where agency itself is never a property trapped inside an individual, but an emergent effect generated between actants within a network. In all three paradigms, the illusion of direct, unmediated human will is exposed as a romantic fiction.

Furthermore, these theories share a radical commitment to an externalized ontology. Mind, desire, and agency do not dwell in the silent interiority of the biological skull. For Girard, desire is interindividual, existing strictly in the space between the subject and the rival. For Activity Theory, cognitive architecture is distributed across the individual, the artifact, and the social division of labor, transforming historical human practice into mental operations. For ANT, agency is entirely decentered, residing strictly in the hybrid associations of human and non-human actors.

Ultimately, these three frameworks unite to redefine what it means to be human. We are not self-generating agents who subsequently choose tools, imitate peers, or enter networks; rather, we are the emergent products of those mediations. Girard reveals how our motives are borrowed; Activity Theory proves how our capabilities are inherited through cultural artifacts; and ANT demonstrates how our actions are scripted by material networks. Together, they offer a unified, profound declaration: human consciousness is a relational symphony, continuously composed through the models we imitate, the tools we wield, and the material networks that weave us into being.

While Mimetic Theory, Activity Theory, and Actor-Network Theory (ANT) converge on the rejection of the isolated Cartesian subject, they violently fracture over what mediates, where agency resides, and toward what end human action is directed. Evaluating this triad through Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology exposes both the unique insights and the metaphysical blind spots of each framework.

Core Points of Divergence

1. The Identity of the Mediator

• Mimetic Theory (Girard): The mediator is exclusively another human subject (the model/rival). Mediation operates through intersubjective desire, social envy, and competitive copying.
• Activity Theory (Vygotsky/Leontiev): The mediator is a cultural-historical artifact (a tool, language, or symbol). Mediation operates through practical labor, cognition, and the internalization of historical intelligence.
• Actor-Network Theory (Latour): The mediator is any heterogeneous actant, human or non-human, biological or synthetic. Mediation operates through structural alignment, delegation, and translation within a network.

2. The Locus of Agency and Motive

• Activity Theory: Strictly anthropocentric. The human Subject holds exclusive claim to motive (smysl) and teleological purpose, while the tool remains an instrument.
• Actor-Network Theory: Strictly symmetrical (Flat Ontology). Agency is an emergent effect of the network; a human and a speed bump both possess agency because both alter outcomes.
• Mimetic Theory: Decentered. Human agency is constantly hijacked by mimetic vectors. Desire originates in the model, reducing the subject to an unwitting imitator within a competitive dynamic.

3. The Structural Telos

• Girard: The resolution of existential conflict, rivalry, and violence through scapegoating or sacred order.
• Activity Theory: The transformation of material and social reality through goal-directed labor and problem-solving.
• Latour: The stabilization, expansion, and “black-boxing” of socio-technical associations.

The Heideggerian Lens: Approval and Rejection

Martin Heidegger’s philosophy acts as a powerful arbiter among these three paradigms, approving of their anti-Cartesian insights while critiquing their underlying metaphysical assumptions.

                     HEIDEGGER'S ONTOLOGICAL CRITIQUE
                                    │
    ┌───────────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┐
    ▼                               ▼                               ▼
MIMETIC THEORY               ACTIVITY THEORY              ACTOR-NETWORK THEORY
• Approval: "Das Man"        • Approval: "Zuhandenheit"   • Approval: "Das Ding"
  (The "They")                 (Readiness-to-hand)          (The relational Gathering)
• Rejection: Anthropologism  • Rejection: "Gestell"       • Rejection: Flattens
  & Psychologism               (Productivist Enframing)     "Dasein" into mere objects

1. Activity Theory and Heidegger

• Heidegger’s Approval: Heidegger strongly aligns with Activity Theory’s insistence that humans engage the world through tools rather than detached contemplation. This mirrors Heidegger’s concept of Readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit): an equipmental context (Zeugzusammenhang) where an artifact is understood through its practical use (in-order-to) rather than as an isolated, passive object (Presence-at-hand / Vorhandenheit).
• Heidegger’s Rejection: Heidegger rejects Activity Theory’s Marxist foundation of human labor as the ultimate ontological ground. By framing reality strictly as raw material to be transformed by human work, Activity Theory risks succumbing to Enframing (Gestell)—the modern technological mindset that reduces the world into a mere reservoir of resources (Bestand / Standing-Reserve) for human optimization.

2. Actor-Network Theory and Heidegger

• Heidegger’s Approval: Latour explicitly draws from Heidegger’s late philosophy of “The Thing” (Das Ding), acknowledging that artifacts are not inert matter but “gatherings” of relationships, institutions, and material conditions.
• Heidegger’s Rejection: Heidegger vehemently rejects ANT’s Flat Ontology. For Heidegger, Dasein (human Being) holds a unique, non-negotiable ontological status: it is the only entity for whom its own Being is an issue, and the sole site where the clearing of Being (Lichtung) occurs. Erasing the distinction between Dasein and an inanimate object destroys the Ontological Difference (Seinsunterschied), reducing human existence to a mere technical component inside a functional system.

3. Mimetic Theory and Heidegger

• Heidegger’s Approval: Girard’s insight that individual desire is borrowed from a model directly parallels Heidegger’s concept of Das Man (the “They”). Heidegger asserts that in everyday existence, Dasein is inauthentic—it eats, drinks, thinks, and desires as “they” do, entirely absorbed by public opinion and social conformity.
• Heidegger’s Rejection: Heidegger rejects Girard’s reduction of human existence to social psychology and anthropologistic mechanics. For Heidegger, inauthenticity is an ontological structure of Dasein’s thrownness into the world, not merely an interpersonal drama of envious rivalry and sacrificial religion.

Comparative Matrix

While Activity Theory illuminates how we manipulate the world, ANT maps how systems bind us, and Mimetic Theory uncovers why we compete for social status, Heidegger exposes their shared limit: all three risk analyzing the mechanics of beings while forgetting the fundamental horizon of Being itself.